A Short History of Turkish Threats to Invade Syrian arab republic

And why they've failed to produce a stable Centre Eastward (and probably won't this fourth dimension, either).

TURKEY - JUNE 23: Turkish troops marching in front of French militarymen in the region of Alexandretta (now called Iskenderun). This territory which belonged to Syria was gave up by France for Turkey not to go to war on the German side. (Photo by Keystone-France/Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images)
TURKEY - JUNE 23: Turkish troops marching in front of French militarymen in the region of Alexandretta (now called Iskenderun). This territory which belonged to Syrian arab republic was gave up by France for Turkey not to go to war on the German language side. (Photo past Keystone-France/Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images)

TURKEY - JUNE 23: Turkish troops marching in front of French militarymen in the region of Alexandretta (now called Iskenderun). This territory which belonged to Syria was gave up by French republic for Turkey not to go to war on the German side. (Photo past Keystone-France/Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images)

Information technology seems that no 1, including perhaps the authorities in Ankara, is entirely articulate on what Turkey'south endgame in Syria is. Recent reports that the United states of america and Turkey had agreed to establish a "safe zone" along the Turkish border were quickly contradicted, while terms like "buffer zone" and "security zone" are now floating around. With Ankara however eager to plant some kind of zone in Syria, it might be a skillful moment to review Turkey's history of threatening to invade its southern neighbor -- and look at to what extent those threats have worked out in Turkey'south favor.

On several occasions, most notably in 1937 and 1998, the Turkish regime discovered just how effective it can be to flex some military musculus along its southern border without actually launching a full-fledged invasion. Indeed, the success of Turkey's previous not-invasions might make a similar approach seem very appealing to policymakers in Ankara trying to decide what to exercise today. Still revisiting this history also suggests that, absent a coherent political or diplomatic strategy for the region, saber rattling in Syrian arab republic'south direction fails to bring Turkey lasting security or stability.

Turkey's disastrous relationship with Syria has its origins in the province of Hatay, a beautiful region that was best known for its Christian history and remarkable cuisine earlier the Syrian civil war. Post-obit the Ottoman Empire's defeat in Globe State of war I, the province, and so known as the Sanjak of Alexandretta, was placed under French command equally part of the Syrian mandate. After Ataturk founded the mod-day Turkish Democracy in 1923, "liberating" Hatay became a thing of national and personal pride. When bilateral negotiations in Paris over the province's fate stalled in 1936, Ataturk set out past railroad train toward the Syrian border, threatening to "resign and lead the army into the Sanjak himself if its fate could not be resolved in a manner consequent with Turkey's honor." His government likewise provided covert support to Turkish nationalist guerrillas planning an insurgency against the French. Then in 1937, equally detailed in Sarah Shield's excellent Fezzes into the River, Ataturk "took to the road one time again to demonstrate the urgency of Turkey's merits." In cities and military bases along the border, the president reviewed his soldiers, hoping to leave the French with no dubiousness over his willingness to settle the issue by force.

It seems that no i, including perchance the regime in Ankara, is entirely clear on what Turkey's endgame in Syria is. Recent reports that the United States and Turkey had agreed to found a "safe zone" along the Turkish edge were speedily contradicted, while terms like "buffer zone" and "security zone" are now floating around. With Ankara still eager to found some kind of zone in Syrian arab republic, information technology might be a proficient moment to review Turkey's history of threatening to invade its southern neighbor — and expect at to what extent those threats have worked out in Turkey's favor.

On several occasions, nearly notably in 1937 and 1998, the Turkish regime discovered just how effective information technology can exist to flex some armed services muscle along its southern edge without actually launching a full-fledged invasion. Indeed, the success of Turkey's previous non-invasions might make a similar approach seem very appealing to policymakers in Ankara trying to make up one's mind what to practice today. However revisiting this history also suggests that, absent-minded a coherent political or diplomatic strategy for the region, saber rattling in Syria'due south management fails to bring Turkey lasting security or stability.

Turkey's disastrous relationship with Syria has its origins in the province of Hatay, a beautiful region that was best known for its Christian history and remarkable cuisine before the Syrian civil state of war. Post-obit the Ottoman Empire'south defeat in Globe War I, the province, then known equally the Sanjak of Alexandretta, was placed under French control every bit function of the Syrian mandate. Afterward Ataturk founded the mod-solar day Turkish Commonwealth in 1923, "liberating" Hatay became a thing of national and personal pride. When bilateral negotiations in Paris over the province's fate stalled in 1936, Ataturk set out past train toward the Syrian border, threatening to "resign and lead the army into the Sanjak himself if its fate could not be resolved in a manner consequent with Turkey's honor." His authorities also provided covert support to Turkish nationalist guerrillas planning an insurgency against the French. Then in 1937, as detailed in Sarah Shield's splendid Fezzes into the River, Ataturk "took to the route over again to demonstrate the urgency of Turkey'south claim." In cities and armed forces bases along the border, the president reviewed his soldiers, hoping to leave the French with no uncertainty over his willingness to settle the issue by forcefulness.

The fight against France's mandate of Syria ended on the eve of Globe State of war II, when France, its strategic position in Europe increasingly desperate, acceded to Turkey's demands and returned Hatay to Turkish command. Patient diplomacy and a well-timed bear witness of strength had secured for Turkey a valuable new province, whose people's loyalty the government and so belatedly won over the grade of the side by side several decades. Indeed, the merely toll Ankara paid for its acquisition was a one-half-century of Syrian hostility.

The Syrians connected to lay claim to Hatay, leading to bug throughout the Cold State of war. Turkish nationalists didn't help matters in the 1950s when they responded to Syrian irredentism by suggesting they might not listen acquiring the neighboring Syrian province of Aleppo, too. (A cartoon from the period shows Aleppo preparing a flag every bit a dowry for Turkey, while a crude extravaganza of Syrian arab republic looks on with anger.) Turkish-Syrian tensions during this menstruation helped button Damascus toward the Soviet Matrimony, thereby setting the stage for another threat of Turkish invasion. When Damascus seemed to exist drifting too far into the Soviet orbit in 1957, Turkey's government suggested that a armed services operation might secure a friendlier Syrian regime. U.S. diplomats nixed the programme, explaining that while they admired Turkey's anti-communist zeal, there was no need to alienate the Arab world with an outright invasion when they could merely proceed discreetly plotting coups instead.

Turkish policy succeeded in alienating Arab states anyway. By the 1980s, persistent friction with Syria — expanded to include a dispute over the allocation of Euphrates River water — led and so-Syrian President Hafez al-Assad to begin supporting the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, the Kurdish nationalists waging a war against the Turkish land. Assad provided the PKK with grooming and arms as leverage confronting Turkey's more powerful military, and he allowed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to make a domicile in Damascus. In the cease, Assad proved largely unable to excerpt concessions from Turkey, simply he did ultimately come closer than any of his predecessors to provoking an actual Turkish invasion. In 1998, the Turkish ground forces one time over again massed on the Syrian border, demanding that Damascus cease its support for the PKK. Conceding to the seriousness of the threat, Assad complied and booted the Kurdish rebels out. (Shortly afterwards being expelled from Damascus, Ocalan was captured by Turkish special forces in Kenya with the help of U.South. intelligence.)

Had Turkey capitalized on its success by pursuing a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish question, Ocalan'southward capture could have been transformative. Instead, the opportunity for a negotiated settlement was squandered. In jail, Ocalan proved newly willing to cooperate, and even many in the Turkish war machine came to realize that the PKK could never be destroyed by force alone. Over the last decade, the ruling Justice and Development Political party, AKP for its Turkish proper name, undertook unprecedented efforts to make peace with the PKK but was never quite committed or courageous plenty to succeed. Bold gestures, like delivering increased Kurdish cultural rights, alternated with (U.Due south.-canonical) air and footing assaults against PKK bases in Iraq like those of the by week.

It remains uncertain just what measures Turkey is prepared to have to keep its proposed "safe zone" in Syria condom. To date, the Turkish military has proved itself to be the vocalization of moderation, while the authorities appears ready to contemplate more invasive measures, if not a total-scale invasion. History gives Turkey grounds to be concerned about the establishment of a PKK safe haven in Syria, while more than recent developments provide ample reason to fear the Islamic State. (The reconsolidation of a hostile Assad government, meanwhile, seems petty more likely at this indicate than the resurrection of the French mandate.)

In the 1930s, Turkey won Hatay and lost Syria. In 1998, it managed to mitigate a civil state of war that now risks erupting with renewed fury. If Ankara hopes that today a combination of threats and limited intervention can solve its nigh pressing problems in Syria, it may well be right. Only if military machine force proves effective in forestalling Kurdish or jihadi gains, information technology has historically proved incapable of achieving what has long eluded Turkey: a stable and secure southern border.

Photo credit: Keystone-French republic/Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images

Nicholas Danforth is a nonresident senior enquiry swain at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. Twitter: @NicholasDanfort

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